Behind the wheel: What drives the effects of error handling? by Dimitrova, Nicoletta et al.
BEHIND THE WHEEL  1 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Behind the Wheel:  
What Drives the Effects of Error Handling 
Nicoletta G. Dimitrova  
Ghent University, Belgium 
Edwin A. J. van Hooft 
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Cathy van Dyck 
VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Peter Groenewegen 
VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nicoletta G. Dimitrova, Ghent 
University, Department of Personnel Management, Work and Organizational Psychology, 
Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium  
E-mail: nicoletta.dimitrova@ugent.be 
Phone: +32 9 264 64 59 
  
BEHIND THE WHEEL  2 
 
Abstract 
Existing research comparing error management (a strategy focusing on increasing the 
positive and decreasing the negative consequences of errors) to error prevention (a strategy 
focusing on working faultlessly), has identified error management as beneficial for multiple 
outcomes.  Yet, due to various methodological limitations, it is unclear whether the effects 
previously found are due to error prevention, error management, or both.  We examine this in 
an experimental study with a 2 (error prevention: yes vs. no) x 2 (error management: yes vs. 
no) factorial design.  Error prevention had negative effects on cognition and adaptive transfer 
performance.  Error management alleviated worry and boosted one’s perceived self-efficacy.  
Overall, the results show that error prevention and error management have unique outcomes 
on negative affect, self-efficacy,  cognition, and performance. 
Keywords: error, negative affect, self-efficacy, cognition, performance 
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Behind the Wheel: 
What Drives the Effects of Error Handling 
 There has been a considerable interest in understanding how people can deal better 
with errors because proper error handling can result in learning and growth, whereas poor 
error handling can cause much harm to oneself and to others.  Prior work has identified two 
error handling strategies: error prevention, which focuses on preventing the occurrence of 
errors as not to suffer their negative consequences, and error management, which suggests to 
accept errors as a part of life, and invest one’s effort in minimizing their negative 
consequences (see Frese & Keith, 2015; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2008).  
The assumption explicitly made in most existing work on error handling is that error 
management is adaptive.  This perspective, which we will refer to as the error management 
advantage perspective has been adopted in most of the error handling literature (e.g., Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege, Nordstrom & Williams, 2003; Frese, Brodbeck, Heinbokel, 
Mooser, Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 1991; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Van Dyck, Van 
Hooft, De Gilder, & Liesveld, 2010).  Error management compared to error prevention, has 
been found to have positive effects on people's affect (e.g., lower frustration and negative 
affect, Chillarege et al., 2003; stronger emotion control, Keith & Frese, 2005), motivation 
(Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2000), cognition (e.g., on-
task thoughts, Dimitrova, Van Dyck, Van Hooft, & Groenewegen, 2015; meta-cognition, Bell 
& Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), and performance (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; 
Chillarege et al., 2003; Dimitrova et al., 2015; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Nordstrom, 
Wendland, & Williams, 1998). 
 An alternative is the error prevention disadvantage perspective, which instead 
focuses on error prevention as being maladaptive (e.g., Loh, Andrews, Hesketh, & Griffin, 
2013).  According to this perspective, the effects previously found could have been driven by 
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the negative effects of error prevention rather than by the positive effects of error 
management.  Nonetheless, the evidence to substantiate such claims in the error handling 
literature is currently missing. 
 A third, synergistic perspective, in line with the high reliability organizations 
literature, suggests that combining error prevention with error management will be even more 
adaptive than using either strategy alone, because during most activities people need to 
balance the two (e.g., Frese & Keith, 2015; Goodman, Ramanujam, Caroll, Edmondson, 
Hofmann, & Sutcliffe, 2011; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Such a combination can potentially 
amplify the strengths while minimizing the weaknesses of the two strategies.  However, no 
study to date has investigated whether combining error prevention with error management 
offers additional benefits over and above error management alone. 
 The main research question we investigate in the current study is whether it is error 
prevention, error management, or their combination that drives the effects on affective (i.e., 
worry), motivational (i.e., self-efficacy), cognitive (i.e., on-task thoughts, negative self- 
related off-task thoughts), and behavioral outcomes (i.e., analogical and adaptive transfer 
performance).  In line with action theory (Frese & Zapf, 1994), existing error handling 
studies investigated whether the error framing provided by error prevention and error 
management impacts affective, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes (for a review see Frese & 
Keith, 2015).  It remains unclear, however, when is it that error management or error 
prevention causes these effects.  Existing error handling research has been criticized (e.g., 
Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Gully, Payne, Koles, & Witeman, 2002; Loh et al., 2013; Dimitrova 
et al., 2015) for exhibiting various methodological limitations (e.g., lack of control groups, 
use of control groups that differ from the experimental groups on multiple dimensions, and 
confounding type of practice with type of instructions).  In the present study we amend those 
limitations by using a full-factorial design and by keeping type of practice constant among 
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groups.  Overall, we aim to contribute to the literature by increasing our understanding of the 
unique effects of error management and error prevention, as well as of their potential 
interaction.  
Error Handling Strategies 
Errors are potentially avoidable (i.e., not due to some unforeseeable chance agency) 
and unintended (i.e., not purposeful) deviations, occurring during goal directed action (i.e., 
errors imply a non-achievement of goals, with achieving the goal as the intention, and the 
error causing the non-achievement as the deviation; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese, 
2011; Reason, 1990).  We define error handling as the process of dealing with errors before 
and after they have occurred.  
Error prevention is a strategy focusing on removing the negative consequences of 
errors by not allowing them to occur in the first place (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Hofmann & 
Frese, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008, Van Dyck, Baer, Frese, & Sonnentag, 2005).  
Although intuitively error prevention is not negative per se, solely focusing on prevention has 
been linked to various negative outcomes, such as hiding errors, lowered learning from 
errors, negative error cascades, lowered psychological safety within teams, and poor 
performance (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 1999; Van Dyck et al., 2005).  These findings may 
contradict common logic, which suggests that preventing errors is good practice.  This 
contradiction might be explained by considering the situation and task.  That is, in predictable 
situations with straightforward tasks, error prevention can be applied and may potentially 
result in even better outcomes than error management.  However, this is not the case in 
situations in which pure error prevention is impossible because people are dealing with novel 
and/or relatively complex tasks, which are also the types of situations and tasks 
predominantly used in error handling research. 
 The other strategy discussed in the context of error handling is error management and 
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focuses on disconnecting the error from its potential negative consequences (Hofmann & 
Frese, 2011).  It is a strategy that "accepts that errors will occur, and is designed to provide a 
second layer of defense, specifically one that intends to intercept and rectify the error prior to 
the accrual of significant negative consequences" (Hofmann & Frese, 2011, p. 32), while 
maximizing potential positive consequences (e.g., learning, secondary error prevention).  
Existing research has shown that in novel situations involving complex tasks error 
management compared to error prevention has positive effects on affect, motivation, 
cognition, and performance (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 2003; Dimitrova 
et al., 2015; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Wood et al., 2000).  A positive association between 
error management and performance has also been found in well-established situations 
involving familiar tasks (see Van Dyck et al., 2005). 
Affective and Motivational Consequences  
In line with previous research, we focus on worry as an indicator of negative affect 
(also see Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese et al., 1991; Nordstrom et al., 1998) and self-efficacy 
as a motivational indicator (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Carter & Beier, 2010).  Making 
errors is by default stressful for people (e.g., Reason, 1990), but the way that errors are 
framed may either be more or less likely to be conducive to stress and worry.  Specifically, 
error management frames errors as neutral occurrences, which if handled properly, do not 
materialize into negative consequences, and which can be utilized as potentially beneficial 
learning opportunities.  The potential positive effects of errors are often overshadowed by 
errors causing a lot of negative emotions that people need to deal with (Frese et al., 1991).  
By becoming more tolerant of errors the emotional turmoil errors cause can be partially 
minimized.  Moreover, making an error is not immediately equated with the potential 
negative consequences because a person can still trap the error and in this way prevent or 
lessen its negative consequences, without preventing the error itself (Frese & Zapf, 1994; 
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Hofmann & Frese, 2011).  This sense of control associated with error management is likely to 
lead to greater experience of self-efficacy.  
Error prevention, in contrast, presents errors as negative occurrences that should be 
prevented, and equates errors with negative consequences.  Experiencing negative affect 
about making errors is a common human response (e.g., Reason, 1990; Zhao, 2011).  The 
realization that one has made an error that could have been avoided and that has potential 
negative consequences is likely to make most people question their competence or self-
efficacy or to worry about the potential consequences of the error.  Accordingly, error 
prevention is likely to result in increased worry and decreased perceived self-efficacy. 
Empirical evidence shows that error management results in less frustration and 
negative affect than error prevention (Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese et al., 1991; Nordstrom et 
al., 1998).  Also, perceived managerial intolerance of errors, which is conceptually similar to 
error prevention, was positively linked to employees’ negative emotions (Zhao, 2011).  
Regarding self-efficacy, previous findings have been less conclusive.  Error handling was not 
found to have an effect on task specific self-efficacy  (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Gully et al., 
2002; Wood et al., 2000), while a study adopting a more general perceived self-efficacy 
measure, similar to the one we use, found that compared to controls, groups receiving error 
management instructions experienced greater task self-efficacy (Carter & Beier, 2010).   
Cognitive Consequences 
 People have limited cognitive capacity and according to cognitive resource allocation 
theory mental resources are distributed among on-task thoughts, off-task thoughts, and self-
regulation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).  On-task thoughts are defined as attention directed 
towards a specific task (Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003), whereas off-task thoughts 
involve disengaging attention away from goal-directed action (Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & 
Davis, 2006).  Earlier research has consistently shown that off-task thoughts, especially 
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negative self-related off-task thoughts (i.e., thoughts that involve a negative self-evaluation) 
take away valuable resources people need to focus on a task (e.g., Carver, 1996; Dickhäuser, 
Buch, & Dickhäuser, 2011).  Self-regulation redirects cognitive resources from off-task 
thoughts to on-task thoughts.  Importantly, cognitive resource allocation theory (Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1989) postulates that the engagement in any of these processes depends on limited 
attentional resources.  Therefore, allocating attentional resources to one activity implies that 
there will be fewer resources for another.  Such reasoning is in line with the work of Keith 
and Frese (2005) and Bell and Kozlowski (2008) investigating error handling in the context 
of emotion control. 
 Similarly to Dimitrova and colleagues (2015) we predict that error management leads 
to more on-task thoughts because people do not have to constantly question themselves and 
their ability while working on the task, which makes it easier to stay task focused.  When 
errors are seen as learning opportunities, making an error does not divert attention away from 
the task as much as when errors are seen as indicators of poor ability.  Moreover, making 
errors signals that a person is failing at prevention, which may lead to questioning of abilities, 
thus resulting in negative self-focused attention rather than in attention toward the task.   
Transfer Performance 
 Existing work differentiates between two types of transfer performance: analogical 
and adaptive transfer performance (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005).  
Analogical transfer "involves using a familiar problem to solving a problem of the same type" 
(Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p. 1967), whereas adaptive transfer involves “using one's existing 
knowledge base to change a learned procedure, or to generate a solution to a completely new 
problem" (Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p.1968).  Regarding error handling and performance, an 
earlier meta-analysis has shown that receiving error management training rather than other 
types of training (e.g., step-by-step proceduralized error-prevention training; pure exploratory 
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training similar to our control condition) results in better adaptive transfer performance 
(Keith & Frese, 2008; also see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008).  These findings were replicated by a 
recent study using identical type of practice (error-based) and differentiating only between 
instruction type: error management or error prevention (Dimitrova et al., 2015).  Regarding 
analogical transfer performance, findings about the efficacy of error management instructions 
are mixed, with some studies finding effects, while others do not (see Dimitrova et al., 2015 
and Keith & Frese, 2008).  According to Keith and Frese (2008) the reason for the mixed 
results might be that “methods that emphasize error free learning and correct procedures for a 
particular task may be equally effective, as they directly teach the required procedures that 
are then merely applied to the similar transfer task” (p. 62).  Overall, existing findings show 
that the effectiveness of error management compared to error prevention is more evident for 
adaptive than for analogical transfer performance (Keith & Frese, 2008). 
Combining Error Prevention and Error Management 
 Although it has previously been suggested that in practice both error prevention and 
error management are necessary (e.g., Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Van Dyck et al., 2005) we do 
not yet know whether, how, and when the two error handling strategies combine with one 
another.  The existing theorizing and research on error handling has primarily focused on 
comparing and contrasting error prevention with error management (e.g., Hofmann & Frese, 
2011; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Nordstrom et al., 1998).  In most situations, however, 
people use a combination of both, in the sense that they first prefer not to make an error, but 
if they do, they adapt and focus on dealing with it and hopefully minimize its negative 
consequences (Hofmann & Frese, 2011).  It is also possible that reminding people of the 
appropriate steps when dealing with errors provides them with universal and easy cognitive 
scripts to follow while working on a task.  If that is the case, the combination of prevention 
and management may be more than the sum of its parts: People will not only proactively 
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prevent errors, but also constructively handle the errors that could not be prevented, resulting 
in more beneficial outcomes than either strategy alone.  An alternative view, however, could 
be that people struggle with simultaneously applying the two strategies while learning a new 
task, which may result in higher cognitive load, inability to cope with the demands of the 
task, and poor performance.  
The current study aims to provide the first empirical investigation clarifying whether 
error prevention and error management interact (if at all) and how (positively or negatively).  
In summary, the rationales discussed lead to the following hypotheses and research question: 
Hypothesis 1: Error management compared to no error management leads to 
(a) more on-task thoughts, (b) fewer negative self-related off-task thoughts, (c) 
less worry, (d) higher perceived task self-efficacy, (e) increased post-practice 
performance (consistent with the error management advantage perspective). 
Hypothesis 2: Error prevention compared to no error prevention leads to (a) 
fewer on-task thoughts, (b) more negative self-related off-task thoughts, (c) 
more worry, (d) lower perceived task self-efficacy, (e) worse post-practice 
performance (consistent with the error prevention disadvantage perspective). 
Research question 1: Does combining error management and error prevention 
lead to better affective, motivational, cognitive or behavioral outcomes than 
either error prevention or error management alone?  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were recruited through flyers distributed in the university cafeteria and 
through student assistants advertising the study.  In total 114 students participated, of whom 
48 were men (Mage = 21.58; SDage = 2.51) and 66 were women (Mage = 22.32; SDage = 2.96).  
While keeping the gender ratios between groups similar, participants were randomly assigned 
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to a 2 (error management instructions: yes vs. no) x 2 (error prevention instructions: yes vs. 
no) between-participants design.  Three participants who indicated participating in a study 
using the same task before were removed from the sample, because they were familiar with 
the purpose of the experiment, resulting in a final sample of 111 students (46 men and 65 
women; Mage = 22.03; SDage = 2.80). 
Procedure 
 The experiment lasted about 80 minutes and was presented as a study of the different 
types of thoughts people have while learning a novel task.  As remuneration for their 
participation, participants received € 9 or course credits. 
 Simulation task.  In the current experiment we used a free-source PC simulation 
called Train Dispatcher 2.0 
© 
(Signal Computer Consultants, 1997) that has been validated as 
an appropriate task to study the effects of error handling strategies in prior research 
(Dimitrova et al., 2015).  In the simulation the participant acts as a train dispatcher whose 
main goal is to ensure that trains reach their correct end destinations.  To move the trains to 
their exit location the dispatcher uses switches (to switch between tracks) and signals (to 
direct the trains in the desired direction).  The format of brief instructions followed by 
practice and performance segments is similar to that used in previous studies (e.g., Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008; Dimitrova et al., 2015; Keith & Frese, 2005). 
 Task familiarization.  All participants received basic instructions outlining the 
general rules of the simulation.  After the brief introduction participants had five minutes to 
familiarize themselves with the task by guiding a train to its end destination.  For that 
purpose, participants received a handout from the experimenter outlining which train they 
had to dispatch, what its arrival time was, and what end destination it had to be directed to.  
Participants who did not manage to guide the train within five minutes were shown by the 
experimenter the correct procedure. 
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 Manipulation.  After getting familiarized with the task all participants received the 
manipulation of error handling strategy instructions.  A pilot study indicated that the error 
handling manipulations were understood by participants as intended and were effective in 
inducing responses consistent with the manipulated strategy.  The instructions for the error 
management only group and the error prevention only group were based on the instructions 
by Nordstrom et al. (1998), Keith and Frese (2005), Carter and Beier (2010) and Dimitrova et 
al. (2015).  In the error management only group, in line with earlier definitions and research 
(see Hofmann & Frese, 2012; Keith & Frese, 2005), participants read a short text framing 
errors positively and focusing on maximizing their positive consequences (i.e., learning).  
Specifically, the error management manipulation stated that “making errors is a natural part 
of the learning process” (also see Keith & Frese, 2005 and Dimitrova et al., 2015) and that 
“when one makes an error it is important to think of how it can be corrected, what can be 
learned from it, and how what you learn can help you in similar situations in the future”.  The 
text also stated that “by successfully handling errors you will learn how to deal with the task 
more effectively” and “if you try to find the useful information errors provide, you will do 
better on the task”.  
Participants in the error prevention only group read a text framing the prevention of 
errors positively (see Dimitrova et al., 2015; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998), 
saying that “errors should not be allowed to occur during the learning process” and “it is 
important to think of how you can prevent errors from occurring, what you can do to 
successfully detect situations possibly leading to errors, and how what you know can help 
you with similar situations in the future”.  Participants also read that “by successfully 
preventing errors you will learn how to deal with the task more effectively” and “if you try to 
prevent errors from occurring you will do better on the task”.  
Participants in the mixed error prevention and error management group received a 
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combination of the error prevention and error management instructions, which were reworded 
in a way that stated that both prevention and management are important for performing well 
on the task.  Participants read that they should "first try to prevent errors, but remain open to 
the possibility that errors will nonetheless occur during learning".  Participants next read that 
"What is important is how you deal with errors and how you can prevent errors in the future.  
When you make an error it is important to think about how this error can be corrected, what 
you can learn from it, what you can do to successfully detect situations possibly leading to 
errors, and how what you know can help you with similar situations in the future so that you 
prevent similar errors”.  
Finally, the error neutral group received a neutral text that was comparable in size to 
the instructions received by the other groups, but contained no information about errors.  
Specifically, the text mentioned general information on what a train is and the types of trains.  
While being related to the task because it was discussing trains, none of the information was 
relevant to the gameplay itself as to avoid influencing participants in any way. 
 Task practice.  Task practice consisted of two ten-minute trials, separated by a two 
minute break.  All participants were given a train schedule which included information on the 
name of trains, their arrival time, entry point and exit destination.  Additionally, during the 
task practice trials participants had access to the full simulation manual.  
Dependent Variables  
 With the exception of worry, which was measured after the practice phase of the task, 
the measurements of self-efficacy, on-task thoughts, and off-task thoughts were administered 
after the two performance trials.
1
 All answers were given on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so). 
Worry.  Participants’ experienced worry during the task was measured with two self-
developed items “During the task I felt anxious” and “During the task I felt worried” (α = 
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.88).  These items were based on the state anxiety items of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; e.g.,“I am worried”), which is among 
the most used measures of state anxiety and worry (Rose & Devine, 2014).  
Self-efficacy.  We measured self-efficacy with five items adapted from Schwarzer 
and Jerusalem’s (1995) Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale that were selected on the basis of 
relevance to the current content and the context of the task.  Items were adjusted to refer to 
the current context by adding “during the task”: “During the task, I was confident that I could 
deal efficiently with unexpected events”, “Thanks to my resourcefulness during the task, I 
knew how to handle unforeseen situations”, “During the task, I could solve most problems if 
I invested the necessary effort”, “During the task, when I was confronted with a problem, I 
could usually find several solutions”, and “During the task, I could usually handle whatever 
came my way”.  The adapted scale showed an internal consistency (α = .87) comparable to 
that found in prior studies (e.g., Schwarzer, Bäßler, Kwiatek, Schröder, & Zhang, 1997; 
values range between α = .81 and α = .91). 
Cognition.  
 On-task thoughts.  We used an abbreviated three item on-task thoughts scale adapted 
from Dimitrova et al. (2015): “I found it easy to concentrate on the task”, “I found it easy to 
keep thinking about what I was supposed to do”, and “It was easy to concentrate on what I 
was doing” (α = .87).  The scale showed reliability similar to that found with the original 6-
item scale in prior research (Dimitrova et al., 2015; Study 1, α = .87; Study 2, α = .89). 
 Negative self-related off-task thoughts.  Negative self-related off-task thoughts were 
measured with three items previously used by Dickhaüser et al. (2011).  The items were: “I 
thought about how poorly I was doing”, “I thought about how dissatisfied I was with my 
achievement”, and “I thought about how unskilled I was in this task” (α = .87). 
Post-practice performance.  We incorporated measures of performance similar to 
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those used by Keith and Frese (2005), Bell and Kozlowski (2008), and Dimitrova et al. 
(2015).  Specifically, participants completed two 10-minute performance trials.  Participants 
were told that the purpose of the performance trials was to show what has been learned 
during practice and instructed to guide as many trains as possible to their end destinations.  
Before each trial participants received the train schedule applicable to the trial.  The final task 
score was calculated automatically by the software. 
 Analogical transfer performance.  The first 10-minute performance trial measured 
analogical transfer and had a level of difficulty comparable to that of the practice session (the 
number of trains to be dispatched was similar to that during the practice session; the track 
territory had a similar number of main tracks and entrances/exits).  We used the final score 
automatically calculated at the end of the first performance trial as a measure of analogical 
transfer performance. 
 Adaptive transfer performance.  Next, after a two-minute break participants started 
working on the final 10-minute performance trial.  The track territory selected for the 
adaptive transfer trial was much more complex than the track territories presented during all 
previous trials.  Specifically, the number of trains that could potentially be dispatched was 
almost 4 times higher than that in prior trials.  Additionally, the number of tracks was 5 times 
higher than in previous trials and so was the number of entrances/exits (3 times higher).  The 
final performance trial also included a new type of switch that completely changed the 
behavior of the tracks, as well as tracks that could only be reached by reversing the train.  
Because the final performance task required adapting and reshaping one’s existing 
knowledge (e.g., using the new switches and reversing trains) and generating solutions to the 
new problems caused by the multi-track switches, it was used for measuring adaptive rather 
than analogical transfer performance (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005).  
The final score as calculated by the program was used as the measure for adaptive transfer 
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performance. 
Control Variables 
 In our analyses, we controlled for participant’s sex, age, prior task experience and 
practice performance.  We included sex because we expected that men may overall 
experience greater self-efficacy while working on the current task than women (also see Bell 
& Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005).  Additionally, earlier research using the same task 
found that men had higher adaptive transfer performance than women (Dimitrova et al., 
2015).  Regarding age, previous error handling research has found that younger participants 
had more on-task and fewer self-related off-task thoughts (Dimitrova et al., 2015) and older 
participants performed worse on tasks requiring computer proficiency (e.g., Carter & Beier, 
2010; Chillarege et al., 2003).  We included prior task experience with similar simulations as 
a control variable because more experienced participants may be responding differently to the 
task than less experienced participants (e.g., worrying less or experiencing greater self-
efficacy).  Additionally, we controlled for participants’ practice score performance to account 
for the possibility that participants emotional, motivational, cognitive, and behavioral 
responses were affected by how well they performed during the practice phase. 
Manipulation Check 
 As a manipulation check, we asked participants two statements.  One statement was 
consistent with following error prevention principles and measured whether participants’ 
attempted to be more cautious while working on the task (“During the task I tried to be as 
cautious as possible”).  Another statement was consistent with following error management 
principles and measured participants’ willingness to see errors in a less negative light (“I 
viewed my errors during the task as surmountable obstacles”).  
Results 
Manipulation check.  Supporting the validity of the manipulation, a 2 (EM: yes vs. 
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no) x 2 (EP: yes vs. no) ANOVA yielded a main effect for error prevention on the error 
prevention statement.  Specifically, participants who received error prevention instructions 
were more likely to say that they tried to be cautious than participants who did not receive 
error prevention instructions, F (1, 107) = 6.64, p = .011, η2p = .06.  Additionally, a second 2 
x 2 ANOVA yielded a main effect for error management on the error management statement.  
Namely, participants who received error management instructions were more likely to 
perceive their errors during the task as surmountable obstacles than participants who did not 
receive error management instructions, F (1, 107) = 5.70, p = .019, η2p = .05. 
[Place Table 1 about here] 
Main Analyses 
Because our dependent variables correlated with each other (see Table 1), we 
conducted a two-way MANCOVA (controlling for age, sex, prior experience with similar 
tasks, and practice performance) to account for the relationships between the dependent 
variables.  The overall MANCOVA (using Pillai’s trace) analysis only showed significant 
effects for error prevention on the dependent variables, V = 0.13, F (6, 98) = 2.47, p = .029, 
η2p = .13, and for practice task performance, V = 0.42, F (6, 98) = 11.84, p < .001, η
2
p = .42, 
on the dependent variables (see Table 2).  No other significant effects were found (all Fs < 
1.84, all ps > .098). 
[Place Table 2 about here] 
Separate univariate two-way ANCOVAs showed main effects of error prevention on 
on-task thoughts, F (1, 103) = 5.96, p = .016, η2p = .06, Cohen’s d = 0.46, negative self-
related off-task thoughts, (1, 103) = 4.63, p = .034, η2p = .04, Cohen’s d = 0.42, and adaptive 
transfer performance, F (1, 103) = 5.06, p = .027, η2p = .05, Cohen’s d = 0.41.  The means as 
displayed in Table 3 indicate that people who received error prevention instructions 
experienced fewer on-task thoughts (M = 3.26, SD = 1.11), more negative self-related off-
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task thoughts (M = 3.22, SD = 1.16), and performed worse during the adaptive transfer trial 
(M = -0.25, SD = 0.78) than the people who did not receive error prevention instructions (M = 
3.71, SD = 0.81, M = 2.74, SD = 1.14, and M = 0.10, SD = 0.93, for on-task thoughts, 
negative self-related off-task thoughts, and adaptive transfer performance, respectively). 
Additionally, although the overall MANCOVA did not show any effects of error 
management, the follow up univariate two-way ANCOVAs showed a significant main effect 
of error management on worry, F (1, 103) = 4.46, p = .037, η2p = .04, Cohen’s d = 0.43.  The 
means (see Table 3) indicate that people who received error management instructions were 
less worried while working on the task (M = 2.01, SD = 0.94) than people who did not 
receive error management instructions (M = 2.46, SD = 1.16).  
 [Place Table 3 about here] 
A separate univariate two-way ANCOVA showed a significant interaction effect of 
error handling instructions on self-efficacy, F (1, 103) = 4.08, p = .046, η2p = .04.  The means 
(see Table 3) indicate that participants who received only error management instructions (M 
= 3.25, SD = 0.76) experienced greater self-efficacy than participants who received no error 
instructions (M = 2.73, SD = 0.84), only error prevention instructions (M = 2.91, SD = 0.94), 
or mixed error management and error prevention instructions (M = 2.72, SD = 1.06).   
Finally, the separate univariate ANCOVAs showed a significant effect of the 
covariate sex on perceived self-efficacy, with men experiencing greater self-efficacy 
compared to women, F (1, 103) = 4.81, p = .031, η2p = .05.  Additionally, the covariate age 
had a significant effect on analogical transfer performance, with younger people performing 
better compared to older people, F (1, 103) = 4.12, p = .045, η2p = .04.  Finally, as can be 
expected, the covariate practice performance showed a significant effect on both analogical, 
F (1, 103) = 65.85, p < .001, η2p = .39 and adaptive transfer performance, F (1, 103) = 13.46, 
p < .001, η2p = .12.  Participants who performed well during the practice phase, were also 
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more likely to perform well during the transfer phase.  No other significant effects were 
found for any of the other control variables (all Fs < 3.13, all ps > .080). 
Discussion 
Theoretical Relevance 
The present study sought to examine what specifically drives the effects of error 
handling strategy on affective, motivational, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes.  We 
advance the error handling literature by reexamining the error management advantage 
perspective that has dominated recent error handling research.  The current results provide 
strongest support for the error prevention disadvantage perspective by suggesting that error 
prevention rather than error management may be driving the previously found effects on 
cognition and performance.  An important implication emerging from this finding is that error 
prevention during training may be bad for task-focus and performance, rather than error 
management being good for it.  Note that such a conclusion is in line with a recent paper by 
Loh and colleagues (2013) who similarly suggest that error prevention is more harmful than 
error management is beneficial.  More specifically, Loh and colleagues (2013) found no 
significant main effect of error management training (EMT) on performance, when 
comparing it to a control group which received identical information and training (active 
exploration) and stated that "...the positive effects of error encouragement reported in prior 
EMT research may actually be attributable to the deleterious impact of error-avoidance 
training" (p. 444).   
Although going against most recent theorizing, which focuses on the benefits of error 
management for cognition and performance, such a finding is in line with the original action 
theory framework (Frese & Zapf, 1994), which advocates error management as an alternative 
to error prevention, due to the negative effects of error prevention, but not due to the positive 
effects of error management.  An observation of the effects found in earlier work suggests 
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that there are bigger differences between groups when error management is compared to error 
prevention than when error management is compared to pure exploration (see Keith & Frese's 
2008 meta-analysis).  Altogether these findings suggest that the conclusions drawn in various 
earlier studies might have been based on a misinterpretation of the role that error 
management plays.  
Nonetheless, before dismissing the role of error management we should interpret the 
complete results, which offer us a more valenced picture.  The ANCOVAs show that error 
management instructions lowered the level of worry experienced.  Moreover, receiving error 
management instructions increased people’s experienced self-efficacy, but only when error 
management was not supplemented with error prevention.  Thus, two major implications of 
our findings are that error management does not make people appraise errors in a more 
positive light but in a less negative light, and that error management influences affect and 
coping (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998). 
Overall, the picture that emerges from our data suggests that error prevention 
dampens task-focus and adaptive transfer performance, as well as amplifies negative self-
evaluative off-task thoughts, whereas error management dampens worry and boosts one’s 
perceived self-efficacy.  The current pattern of findings shows that instead of affecting the 
same variables, error management and error prevention have unique outcomes.  Thus, our 
results highlight that there may be a grain of truth in both the error prevention disadvantage 
perspective and the error management advantage perspective.  However, which perspective is 
valid seems to depend on what outcome is being investigated.  An important theoretical 
implication of these findings is that the two error handling strategies appear to be operating 
through separate pathways.  Error prevention, influences people’s cognition, in terms of their 
task-related and task-unrelated thoughts, and their actual behavior, in terms of adaptive 
transfer performance.  Error management, in contrast, influences coping by dampening 
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negative emotion, as evidenced by less worry.  The present study then contributes to existing 
theorizing by identifying those pathways and offering an explanation to what error prevention 
and error management actually have impact on. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Although our study offers novel and valuable findings, some limitations should be 
addressed.  First, in line with prior theorizing and research (Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese et 
al., 1991; Nordstrom et al., 1998), we investigated only negative affect.  Future research 
should test whether error management can increase coping by both reducing negative affect 
and increasing positive affect, whereas error prevention can decrease positive affect.  More 
generally, future research should investigate a broader range of potential outcomes of error 
management and error prevention, with specific attention to testing the boundary conditions 
of our effects (e.g., in terms of task settings, task novelty).  In addition, further research is 
needed to clarify if and under what conditions error prevention can have positive rather than 
negative effects.  
Second, due to the timing of measurements – all measurements with the exception of 
worry were administered after participants completed the two performance trials – our design 
did not allow for properly testing potential mediation effects of cognitive resource allocation 
and self-efficacy on performance.  Previous research shows that the effects of error handling 
on performance go through affective, motivational, and cognitive pathways (e.g., Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008; Dimitrova et al., 2015; Keith & Frese, 2005).  In the abovementioned 
studies affect, motivation, and cognition were always measured during or immediately after 
the practice phase.  It is likely that people’s responses change during the course of practicing 
a task.  Such a change is evidenced by the finding that participant’s frustration levels are 
similar immediately after practice, but after the performance phase, participants receiving 
error prevention training show greater frustration than participants receiving error 
BEHIND THE WHEEL  22 
 
management training (Frese et al., 1991; however, note that in this study error management 
instructions were paired with exploratory training and error prevention instructions were 
paired with errorless training).  Additionally, further supporting this line of reasoning, the 
correlations found in a previous study (Dimitrova et al., 2015) between on-task thoughts 
during practice and analogical and adaptive transfer performance were positive, whereas in 
the present study, no relationship was found between post-practice on-task thoughts and 
performance.  We recommend that future research more thoroughly investigates changes in 
affect, motivation, and cognition during and after the practice and performance phases so as 
to clarify if and how stable effects are over time.  Additionally, it will be interesting to test 
whether the same effects as reported here emerge when incorporating measures immediately 
after practice.  
Third, our choice of task may have negatively affected motivation as the task was not 
focused on skills participants necessarily wanted or needed to learn for a specific purpose 
going beyond the experiment itself.  During training in organizations there are more 
incentives for learning new skills, whereas the task we used in our experiment could have 
been seen by participants as unrelated to their goals, resulting in general amotivation.  In fact, 
amotivation offers a compelling explanation for finding no correlations between performance 
and on-task thoughts or negative self-related off-task thoughts.  Experiencing more negative 
self-related off-task thoughts suggests that a person is invested in the task.  Similarly, being 
focused (more on-task thoughts) implies that the person is motivated to work on the task.  
Consequently, our findings might indicate that participants were having a relatively low 
motivation throughout the study.  Additionally, the task we used has certain characteristics 
(i.e., learning and fast decision-making required, timed) that may limit its generalizability.  
We encourage replicating the current study in naturalistic organizational settings with 
working samples involved in tasks with varied characteristics in order to test the external 
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validity of our findings. 
Finally, although our results did not provide much support for combining error 
prevention and error management, we are convinced that more research is necessary.  Life 
requires us to both prevent and manage errors, but it is possible that most people are not 
particularly good at doing both at the same time and may thus engage in serial error 
prevention and error management (switching when necessary).  Future work should shed 
light on individuals' serial and simultaneous application of error prevention and error 
management strategies.  Additionally, the combination of error prevention and error 
management strategies poses important questions for organizations.  According to Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2007) an organization that is highly reliable is capable of both preventing and 
managing errors.  Yet, it is unclear if the people within an organization are preventing and 
managing errors simultaneously during every task.  Also, it is unclear if teams perform better 
when all members of a team focus on prevention, on management, or on a combination of the 
two.  A related question is whether it is useful to have some members within a team focus on 
error prevention, while others focus on error management aspects.  Additionally, it would be 
worthwhile investigating what is the best proportion of people preventing and managing 
errors within a team, and if this proportion is influenced by context and task specifics (e.g., in 
R&D departments it may be good to have a majority of error management strategy people 
and a minority of error prevention strategy people to ground them while working on creative 
tasks).  Finally, future research should seek to examine whether and how instructions interact 
with people’s natural error handling strategy. 
Practical Relevance 
Although the primary focus of the present study was mainly theoretical integration, 
clarification, and extension, the present results offer some valuable practical implications.  
First, including error prevention in training appears to be detrimental for thinking and 
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adaptive transfer performance.  Accordingly, the overly common training using prevention 
instructions should be reconsidered as a good manner of learning new information.  By 
instructing people to prevent errors, everything that subsequently goes wrong activates 
negative self-related off-task thoughts, simultaneously lowering on-task thoughts.  Second, 
providing error management instructions can positively influence people’s coping abilities by 
helping them to lower their worry and increase their perceived self-efficacy when dealing 
with difficulties.  Overall, our recommendation for people and organizations is to minimize 
the use of error prevention during new skill development due to its harmful effects on 
cognition and performance.  Instead, the alternative of using error management instructions is 
to be preferred because it nurtures people’s coping capabilities. 
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Footnotes 
     1
 Our questionnaires also included measures of general off-task thoughts and ego depletion. 
For reasons of parsimony these were not included in the manuscript. No significant main or 
interaction effects were found for general off-task thoughts and ego depletion, and inclusion 
of these measures did not alter the results for the overall MANCOVA.   
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Table 1 
 
Correlations Between Study Variables  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Independent variables:             
1 EM (No/Yes) -            
2 EP (No/Yes) -.03 -           
 Control variables:             
3 Sex -.03 -.01 -    
      
4 Age .04 -.03 .12 -   
      
5 Prior experience with similar tasks .22* -.02 -.06 .06 -  
      
6 Practice performance .00 -.01 -.07 -.21* -.07 -       
 Dependent variables:             
7 Worry -.21* .03 .10 .14 -.07 -.16 - 
     
8 Perceived self-efficacy .10 -.10 -.20* -.05 .09 -.15 -.37*** - 
    
9 On-task thoughts .14 -.23* -.05 -.01 .01 -.13 -.40*** .54*** - 
   
10 Negative self-related off-task thoughts -.06 .20* .01 -.02 -.05 .11 .35*** -.48*** -.40*** - 
  
11 Analogical transfer performance -.05 -.02 -.11 -.27** -.05 .64*** -.17 -.14 -.06 .11 - 
 
12 Adaptive transfer performance -.03 -.20* -.01 -.08 -.07 ..35*** -.16 -.00 .07 .06 .44*** - 
 
Note. N = 111. EM = Error management: 0= No and 1 = Yes. EP = Error prevention: 0= No and 1 = Yes. Sex: 0 = man and 1 = woman. The scores for 
practice, analogical and adaptive transfer performance are standardized in line with the recommendations by Bell and Kozlowski (2008). All tests are 
two-tailed.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001  
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Table 2 
 
Results MANCOVA and Univariate ANCOVAs 
 
 
 
MANCOVA Univariate ANCOVAs 
 
  
  
Worry 
Perceived 
self-efficacy 
On-task 
thoughts 
Negative self-
related off-
task thoughts 
Analogical 
transfer 
performance 
Adaptive transfer 
performance 
 
F 
Pillai's 
trace F η2p F η
2
p F η
2
p F η
2
p F η
2
p F η
2
p 
Error management 0.90 0.05 4.46* 0.04 0.71 0.01 2.10 0.02 0.62 0.01 0.33 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Error prevention 2.47* 0.13 0.09 0.00 1.15 0.01 5.96* 0.06 4.63* 0.04 0.09 0.00 5.06* 0.05 
Error management x Error prevention 1.84 0.10 0.40 0.00 4.08* 0.04 0.06 0.00 1.59 0.02 3.85 0.04 0.76 0.01 
Control variables:   
            Sex 1.08 0.06 0.44 0.01 4.81* 0.05 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Age 0.95 0.06 1.46 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.00 4.12* 0.04 0.07 0.00 
Task experience 0.48 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.88 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Practice performance 11.84*** 0.42 1.90 0.02 3.13 0.03 2.33 0.02 1.35 0.01 65.85*** 0.39 13.46*** 0.12 
 
Note. Error management: 0= No and 1 = Yes. Error prevention: 0= No and 1 = Yes. Sex: 0 = man and 1 = woman. F values significant at p <.05 are shown in bold.  
* p < .05. *** p < .001  
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for all Study Variables per Group 
 
Error Management 
Only 
Error Prevention 
Only 
Combined Error 
Prevention and 
Error Management Error Neutral 
 
(EM: yes; EP: no) 
N = 28 
(EM: no; EP: yes) 
N = 28 
(EM: yes; EP: yes) 
N = 26 
(EM: no; EP: no) 
N = 27 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Control variables:     
Age 22.00 (3.04) 21.61 (2.50) 22.30 (2.80) 22.22 (2.93) 
Task experience 2.28 (1.16) 1.75 (1.27) 2.04 (1.09) 1.59 (0.89) 
Practice performance -0.08 (0.94) -0.09 (1.11) -0.05 (0.80) -0.03 (0.86) 
Dependent variables:     
Worry 2.03 (0.93)a 2.54 (1.30) b 1.98 (0.96) a 2.37 (1.01) b 
Perceived self-efficacy 3.25 (0.76) a 2.91 (0.94) b 2.72 (1.06) b 2.73 (0.84) b 
On-task thoughts 3.82 (0.80) a 3.11 (1.12) b 3.41 (1.10) b 3.59 (0.82) a 
Negative self-related off-task thoughts 2.55 (1.10) a 3.15 (1.27) b 3.28 (1.05) b 2.95 (1.16) a 
Analogical transfer performance -0.22 (0.54) -0.18 (0.77) -0.01 (1.11) 0.10 (0.88) 
Adaptive transfer performance 0.00 (0.74) a -0.29 (0.75) b -0.20 (0.83) b 0.22 (1.10) a 
 
Note. N = 111. EM = Error management. EP = Error prevention. The scores for practice, analogical and adaptive transfer performance are 
standardized in line with the recommendations by Bell and Kozlowski (2008). Cell means that do not share subscripts were significantly 
different from each other at p < .05 in the univariate two-way ANCOVAs. 
 
 
